The coup-making coalition's mistaken basic premise

       All things considered, the military is now resurgent.
       Its budget has increased substantially. It has reversed many of the security sector reforms.
       That Thailand remains increasingly locked in a protracted political crisis three years after its latest military coup suggests the generals have not succeeded in their aims.
       Corruption allegations and conflicts of interest are still rife. Meddling with the bureaucracy's operations and promotions continues. Society is more polarised now than at the time of the Sept 19,2006 coup.
       Challenges to the monarchy, as manifested in the blocked websites and lese majeste cases, have grown markedly.
       These four stated coup conditions have not been justified. In fact, they have exacerbated in view of the political machinations that have unfolded over the past three years.
       Where the generals went wrong is rooted in their - and their backers' and allies'- fundamental premise. Their putsch was intended not just to get rid of Thaksin Shinawatra but to undo his unwitting but lasting legacy in the awakening of the Thai rural masses.
       These previously neglected sections of the electorate became stakeholders during the Thaksin years. Their political consciousness rose irreversibly. With a stake in the system, they have been unwilling to go away quietly.
       The coup-making coalition's chief mistake was their attempt to turn back the clock to pre-Thaksin Thailand. This mistake has been working its way through the body politic in various manifestations.Corrective measures and pacification campaigns from the sufficiency movement and the military's "moderation society" to Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva's "I love Thailand" have been unable to rein in and put a lid on these newly unleashed forces of change.
       The long trail of Thaksin's corruption,cronyism and abuses of power meant that most people did not come out to protest against the coup when it took place. Apart from small groups of demonstrators in the streets of Bangkok, a wait-and-see atmosphere prevailed. The glaring exception was the taxi driver,Nuamthong Praiwan, who first drove his car into a tank and later hung himself in remonstration.
       The coup-makers then appointed a lacklustre interim government and saw to it that the coup-making coalition was given the upper hand under a new set of rules enshrined in the 2007 constitution to pin down the development of democratic institutions.
       Most baffling of all was the coupmaking coalition's unwillingness to simply acknowledge that Thaksin had to go because he was a crook, but that his positive legacies in popular stakeholdership would be incorporated. Getting rid of parts of the Thaksin regime while retaining some in order to move on would have engendered reconciliation and a way forward.
       All things considered, the military is now resurgent. Its budget has increased substantially. It has reversed many of the security sector reforms that were broached in the late 1990s, including more streamlined personnel. Its anachronistic agencies from decades past, particularly the Internal Security Operations Command, have been given new leases of life. Isoc is now the main driver of the moderation society, or "mo-so," campaign. The top brass are in charge of key policy areas that had been taken away after their disgraceful intervention that led to the crisis in May 1992.
       Civil-military relations are increasingly dictated by the brass. Indeed, the generals are back, and this time they will stay and insist on their role as the selfprofessed protectors and guardians of how Thailand shapes up in the near term.
       Although it has been costly to Thailand's democratic development, the ascendancy of the military has made the coup, despite all of its problematic consequences, worthwhile for the generals. They have also learned by doing.The results of the last coup do not encourage them to seize power directly again, which is the "first-best" outcome in military interventions in politics. It would be difficult to find an effective interim government to keep the economy chugging along. Thailand's international credibility would diminish. Diplomats,investors and tourists are wary of coupmaking countries. The generals themselves would lose prestige at home and abroad.
       They have found a "second-best" option that has worked rather well in their scheme of things. With allies in Parliament, the bureaucracy and civil society,the generals could see to it that a sitting government does not survive in the topsyturvy political arena.
       This was evident last year when the military chose not to follow two elected governments' instructions.
       At the same time, they can broker and nudge forward a government of elected MPs whom they could work with and whose instructions in dealing with street protests they have duly followed.Mr Abhisit's government, for example,comprises elected representatives but it is seen as not really an elected government. This is a nuanced and sophisticated coup-making formula tailored for the globalisation age. It is not ideal for the generals but it works under the pressures and constraints at home and abroad.
       The most striking development in Thailand's coup-making circles is the coalescence of a unit-based, rather than the age-old class-based, lines of power.In the recent past, coup-makers harked back to their school days as members of the same graduating class from the military academy. Class Five was infamous during the 1991-92 period, preceded by Class Seven in the 1980s.
       This time, anybody who is to be somebody in the line of command is likely to hail from the 21st Infantry Regiment,which is under the 2nd Infantry Division,located in the eastern provinces.
       This niche of select officers is popularly known as the "tiger soldiers" or "eastern tigers". Their rise and prominence have been well documented in the Thai media as public information.
       Coup-making considerations in the guise of nation, religion and monarchy,whether as a first-best or second-best preference, are likely to fall under their domain in the foreseeable future.
       The writer is Director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University.